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There have been many attempts from feminist philosophers and scholars to define 
the gender categories and, particularly, the concept woman. However, all of the 
theories attempting to define woman seem to suffer from the inclusion problem, 
which is a theory’s failure to account for all women in their definition of woman. 
Katherine Jenkins, however, has argued that her theory avoids the inclusion 
problem. She does this by dividing her article into three parts: (1) an assessment 
of Sally Haslanger’s argument, (2) a proposal of two senses of gender, and (3) a 
construction and explanation of her inclusive ameliorative account. I will start by 
summarizing these three parts then I will argue that her theory fails at avoiding 
the inclusion problem because her definition of woman is circular. 
2.0 Summary of the Three Parts 
2.1 Assessment of Haslanger’s Argument 
To begin, I will split Jenkins’ assessment of Haslanger’s argument into three 
parts: explanation, objection, and salvaging. First, Jenkins explains how 
Haslanger uses a method of conceptual analysis called the ameliorative inquiry 
and then creates the notion of a target concept. A target concept is the concept of 
F-ness that “a particular group should aim to get people to use, given a particular 
set of goals that the group holds.”1 An ameliorative inquiry is the project of 
arriving at that target concept. So, an ameliorative inquiry is not epistemic, it is 
moral. It concerns which target concept we should use. In Haslanger’s 
ameliorative inquiry into the concept woman, she concludes that we should use 
the target concept “someone who is socially subordinated in some way on the 
basis of presumed female sex.”2 She claims that this target concept protects her 
theory from the inclusion problem because “although not all prima facie women 
are included, all prima facie women who are subject to oppression are included.”3 
However, Jenkins objects saying that Haslanger’s target concept does not 
account for some trans women and that if this target concept of woman were 
adopted, then it would aggravate the existing marginalization of trans women 
 
1 Katherine Jenkins, “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman*,” 
Ethics 126 (2016): 395. 
2 Jenkins, “Amelioration and Inclusion,” 395. 
3 Ibid. 
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within feminist discourse.4 For example, Haslanger’s target concept could not 
account for a trans woman who “does not publicly present as a woman and is 
perceived as a man by people around her.”5 Additionally, it would not account for 
a trans woman who does publicly present as a woman, but whose gender 
presentation is not respected by those around her.6 Jenkins then speculates 
whether or not Haslanger fully realized the troubling consequences of such an 
unacceptable exclusion. This exclusion is absolutely unacceptable because it 
violates the goal(s) of feminism (e.g., to end the oppression against women): 
“Trans people in general are a severely disadvantaged and marginalized group in 
society, suffering oppression and injustice in multiple respects including 
discriminatory denial of goods such as employment, medical care, and housing; 
consistently negative portrayals in the media; and particularly high risks of 
violence… Failure to respect the gender identifications of trans people is a serious 
harm and is conceptually linked to forms of transphobic oppression and even 
violence.7”8 So, this led Jenkins to think that Haslanger hadn’t realized this 
consequence. If she had, then it does not seem that she would have promoted it as 
the explanation of the “central and core phenomena” of the concept woman meant 
to benefit feminist scholarship. Thus, Haslanger’s theory fails to avoid the 
inclusion problem because it fails to account for the gender identifications of trans 
women. 
Third, Jenkins attempts to salvage Haslanger’s method of ameliorative 
inquiry. She does this because she believes that it “is in fact well placed to 
respond to the inclusion problem as it manifests in regard to trans women, 
provided due attention is paid to having an inclusive understanding of the identity 
of the agents of inquiry.”9 In other words, she does this because it has the 
potential to avoid the inclusion problem. This potential, however, is unlocked 
only when the identities of the agents of inquiry are respected. And the identities 
of the agents of inquiry are respected only when the target concept(s) account for 
them. Haslanger’s target concept does not account for the identities of trans 
 
4 Ibid, 396. 
5 Ibid, 400. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Talia Mae Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the 
Politics of Illusion,” Hypatia 22 (2007): 43-65. 
8 Jenkins, “Ameliorative and Inclusion”, 396. 
9 Ibid, 406. 
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women and, thus, it alone is not sufficient for avoiding the inclusion problem. So, 
in order for the inquiry to avoid the inclusion problem, either a replacement target 
concept needs to be discovered that accounts for all the identities of the agents of 
inquiry, or more target concepts need to be discovered that account for the 
identities of trans women. This is where Jenkins begins her conceptual 
exploration. 
 
2.2 Proposal of Two Senses of Gender 
Jenkins begins her exploration by first addressing Haslanger’s target concept. She 
does this because, although it excluded trans women, it still seemed to grasp an 
important aspect of the phenomenon of gender – an aspect that Jenkins later calls 
gender as class. This redeeming kernel is crucial because it is the reason that 
Jenkins does not seek a replacement target concept and, instead, turns to look for 
another target concept that respects the identities of trans women.10 The first step 
in doing this, however, is to locate an aspect of the phenomenon of gender that 
accounts for the identities of trans women.11 Such an aspect would satisfy 
feminism’s goal of being trans-inclusive and would serve as a foundation for a 
new target concept. In taking this first step, Jenkins relies on the following insight 
from Haslanger: genders are subject positions that emerge from a “social matrix 
of practices, norms, institutions, material structures, rationales, and so forth.”12 
Additionally, this social matrix is heavily shaped by whatever ideology is 
dominant within it and, as a result, the phenomenon of gender is heavily shaped 
by this dominant ideology. However, the phenomenon of gender is not 
determined entirely by the proponents of the dominant ideology. This is because 
their understanding of the phenomenon can be disputed, resisted, or temporarily 
elided in various ways by the proponents of non-dominant ideologies.13 From this 
insight, Jenkins deduces that gender can be understood at a local level because 
 
10 Although, Jenkins does not deny that there could be one target concept that respects all the 
identities of the agents of inquiry. She keeps Haslanger’s, which she called gender as class, 
because of the redeeming kernel, viz. the important aspect that the target concept grasps (more on 
this later). 
11 Remember that an ameliorative inquiry is about discovering the concept of F-ness that “a 
particular group should aim to get people to use, given a particular set of goals that the group 
holds.” The particular group in both Haslanger and Jenkins’ case, includes all feminists or at least 
attempts to include all feminists. 
12 Ibid, 407. 
13 Ibid, 407. 
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subject positions are a product of multiple ideologies within a social matrix – not 
just the dominant ideology. If this is the case, then there is a gap that distinguishes 
between gender as it’s understood by the dominant ideology and gender as it’s 
understood by non-dominant ideologies. Jenkins argues that the former 
understanding constitutes gender as class and is grasped by Haslanger’s target 
concept while the latter constitutes a trans-inclusive aspect that remains to be 
grasped by a target concept. She then labels this other aspect gender as identity 
and begins to define it along with gender as class: 
 
S is classed as a woman within a context C iff S is marked in C as a target 
for subordination on the basis of actual or imagined bodily features 
presumed to be evidence of a female’s role in biological reproduction. 




S has a female gender identity iff S’s internal ‘map’ is formed to guide 
someone classed as a woman through the social or material realities that 
are, in that context, characteristic of women as a class.14 
 
Before I move on, there are some things that need clarification. First, Jenkins 
notes in a footnote here that having a female gender identity is different from 
identifying as a woman because the former does not imply that identifying as a 
woman is necessarily a conscious process.15 One can certainly have a female 
gender identity without identifying as a woman. For example, a recently 
transitioned trans woman could say that “she had always had a female gender 
identity but that she only recently begun to identify as a woman.”16 Second, S’s 
internal map is a metaphor for the nature of gender identity. It is supposed to 
explain not only how gender identity is something lived out and explored but also 
something embodied and objective. If gender identity is like a map, then the 
boundaries of that identity do not change, but our knowledge of our gender 
 
14 Ibid, 408, 410. 
15 Ibid, 410. 
16 Ibid. 
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identity does – it changes the more we explore.17 So, if one’s internal map brings 
them into contact with the social or material realities or boundaries that 
characterize the life of someone classed as a woman, then they have a female 
gender identity. This is different from being classed as a woman because the 
dominant ideology does not determine whether or not someone has a female 
gender identity. So, being classed as a woman and having a female gender 
identity, Jenkins claims, are both required for a successful ameliorative inquiry 
into the concept woman, “such that they should be considered ‘twin’ target 
concepts.”18 
 
2.3 Construction & Explanation of Jenkins’ Inclusive Ameliorative Account 
In the previous sections, I explained how Jenkins concludes that the target 
concepts being classed as a woman and having a female gender identity are both 
required for a successful ameliorative inquiry. In this section, Jenkins considers 
how these target concepts match with linguistic terms. In other words, she turns to 
the question: How do these two twin target concepts match the term “woman”? 
Jenkins argues that, in today’s context, the term “woman” should be allocated to 
gender as identity, given the fact that “society at large displays great amounts of 
transphobia and cissexism.”19 She argues for this conclusion for three reasons: if 
the term “woman” was allocated to gender as class instead, then (1) the existing 
marginalization of trans women within feminism would be reinforced, (2) cis 
women would gain more power in the political sphere, and (3) it would invite all 
women to abandon their identity as a woman since it articulates “a negative ideal 
that challenges male dominance.”20 This invitation, Jenkins argues, would be 
received differently by cis women who are pushed towards this negative ideal 
than trans women who struggle to claim it. Thus, the invitation would cause a 
division: the trans women will not be willing to abandon their identity as a woman 
because they struggle to claim it whereas cis or prima facie women do not. Each 
of these three reasons together makes allocating the term “woman” to gender as 
class counterproductive for feminism’s goals. So, “woman” should instead be 
 
17 Perhaps identity is similar to a map like Jenkins describes: It remains the same throughout our 
life (viz., you are always you) but our knowledge of it changes the more we explore it. 
18 Jenkins, “Ameliorative and Inclusion,” 414. 
19 Ibid, 418-419. 
20 Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” in 
Resisting Reality, 240. 
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allocated to gender as identity. At first, this allocation of terms seems to move 
away from Jenkins’ conclusion that both target concepts are required for a 
successful ameliorative inquiry. However, she says that the considerations that 
motivated the allocation of terms are entirely contingent. In fact, one would be 
justified in allocating the term “woman” to gender as class only if, and in that 
case because, the dominant ideology or “society at large” began to respect the 
gender identifications of the agents of inquiry. Therefore, both target concepts are 
still required for a successful ameliorative inquiry and the term “women” should 
be allocated to gender as identity (i.e., should be used to refer to people who have 
a female gender identity), given today’s context. 
3.0 Objections, Responses, and Replies to Responses 
3.1 Why Not Jettison Gender as Class? 
As I read Jenkins’ article, three objections came to mind. The first one originated 
with the question: If gender as identity accounts for all who have an identity, then 
why do we need gender as class? It seems fine to jettison gender as class since 
what it accounts for – viz., oppressed prima facie women – is already accounted 
for by gender as identity. I suppose that Jenkins would respond by saying that 
gender as identity is a response to the injustice that gender as class highlights: the 
marginalization and oppression of women caused by the unjust structures and 
definitions of the dominant ideology. The target concept classed as a woman 
grasps an important aspect of the phenomena of gender and, thus, it can not be 
jettisoned even if gender as identity accounts for everything that gender as class 
does. This seems to make sense because so long as there is a dominant and a non-
dominant ideology present within the same context and so long as each of their 
concepts of F-ness differs, then there will always be two target concepts. It won’t 
be until the dominant ideology respects the gender identities of the agents of 
inquiry that gender as class will be sufficient for meeting the feminist goal of 
ending the oppression of women. 
3.2 Vagueness  
A second objection concerns vagueness: If there are multiple target concepts for 
the concept woman and if the one that people should use changes frequently, then 
this would lead to issues of vagueness on a grand scale. Everyone within context 
C would be morally obligated to use the one target concept of woman. But what if 
that target concept changes due to a rapidly changing social matrix, such that a 
new target concept should be used every few decades? Or years? Or months? 
6




Everyone would be completely confused. I think Jenkins would reply by saying 
that the social matrix is not something that changes as rapidly as I might imagine. 
Dominant ideologies, and ideologies in general, are not so easily abandoned by 
those who hold them. Their influence is rooted deep into the social matrix and 
permeates the structures of the matrix. So, issues of vagueness will only arise 
during the times that these ideologies change, which are few and far between so to 
speak. In other words, there will be vagueness within the process of change, but 
the difference between the understandings of the concept woman before and after 
the process of change will be distinct. One will be just and the other will not. So, 
the issue of vagueness is present within the change, but it is not vicious because: 
(1) the changes are few and far between and (2) because our moral obligation to 
adopt the just understanding of the concept woman is clear throughout the process 
of change. This seems convincing to me; so, I would be willing to agree. 
 
3.3 Circularity & Internal Map 
Lastly, I had two dual concerns for Jenkins’ target concept having a female 
gender identity. My first concern was that it was circular. It seems that S has a 
female gender identity if and only if S has an internal map of this sort – the 
female gender identity sort. If this is the case, then Jenkins’ target concept needs 
to be reworked or jettisoned. The second concern I had for Jenkins’ target concept 
having a female gender identity related to having an internal map. But what does 
this mean? And how can one’s internal map guide someone else who is classed as 
a woman? Regarding this first question, I suppose Jenkins would respond by 
saying that having an internal map means having an identity, such that one’s 
identity has boundaries and is meant to be explored just like a map. Regarding the 
second question, I think Jenkins could respond by saying that the phrase 
“someone classed as a woman” is not included to represent someone else but 
rather is included to capture the close relationship between being classed as a 
woman and having a female gender identity. Then she could offer an explanation 
of this close relationship in order to respond to my first concern of circularity: The 
two target concepts are distinct; however, they are in a close relationship because 
the latter relies on the former. In other words, one’s having a female gender 
identity depends on one’s contact with the norms that characterize the life of a 
someone classed as a woman. “What is important is that one takes those norms to 
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be relevant to oneself.”21 Thus, she would conclude, S’s having a female gender 
identity is not simply determined by S having an internal map “of this sort.” I 
would reply saying that one’s taking the norms to be relevant to oneself is the 
same or sufficiently similar to self-identifying as a woman. If this is the case and 
the term “woman” is allocated to those who have a female gender identity, then S 
is a woman if and only if S self-identifies as a woman. So, the biconditional is 
circular because “woman” is now in the definition of “woman.” This circularity 
issue seems to undermine Jenkins’ whole project since there is now no target 
concept that accounts for trans women. Thus, trans women are still excluded and 
the inclusion problem has reappeared. 
4.0 Conclusion 
In this essay, I analyzed Katherine Jenkins’ ameliorative inquiry into the concept 
woman. I did this by first explaining how she assessed Sally Haslanger’s 
argument and concluded that an additional target concept was needed in order to 
account for the identities of trans women. Then I explained her exploration of the 
phenomena of gender and how she discovered a second aspect within the 
phenomena that respected the gender identities of trans women. Lastly, I 
described Jenkins’ two conclusions: First, that the target concepts being classed 
as a woman and having a female gender identity are equally crucial because of 
their close relationship. Second, that the term “woman” should be used to refer to 
people who have a female gender identity instead of people who are classed as a 
woman. After I explained Jenkins’ two conclusions, I offered objections and 
discovered that Jenkins’ definition of woman is circular. Thus, it cannot be used 
to account for trans women. Therefore, Jenkins’ theory fails at avoiding the 
inclusion problem because her definition of woman is circular. 
 
 
21 Jenkins, “Ameliorative and Inclusion,” 411. 
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